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Why Emotions Do Not Solve the Frame Problem     
By Madeleine Ransom  
  
Abstract: Attempts to engineer a generally intelligent artificial agent 
have yet to meet with success, largely due to the (intercontext) frame 
problem. Given that humans are able to solve this problem on a daily 
basis, one strategy for making progress in AI is to look for disanalo-
gies between humans and computers that might account for the dif-
ference. It has become popular to appeal to the emotions as the 
means by which the frame problem is solved in human agents. The 
purpose of this paper is to evaluate the tenability of this proposal, 
with a primary focus on Dylan Evans’ search hypothesis and Anto-
nio Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. I will argue that while the 
emotions plausibly help solve the intracontext frame problem, they 
do not function to solve or help solve the intercontext frame prob-
lem, as they are themselves subject to contextual variability.  
 
 
1. What is the frame problem?  
 
The frame problem began as an issue in classical artificial intelli-
gence concerning how to represent in formal logic the effects of ac-
tions without having to cumbersomely represent the non-effects of 
actions (McCarthy & Hayes 1969). When an agent acts, the world 
changes in some ways, but in many others it stays the same. How 
can a system update its database (or ‘beliefs’) to reflect these chang-
es? If one simply excludes the non-effects from the program and on-
ly represents the effects of the actions then the problem is that it is 
not a matter of logic that everything else does in fact stay the same. 
Though it may be a matter of common sense, the artificial system 
cannot make this deductive inference from the limited information it 
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possesses. If one then opts to include the non-effects in the program, 
the problem is that this quickly becomes computationally intractable, 
because the number of non-effects one must include is staggeringly 
large and leads to a combinatorial explosion. 
 
While there are now several adequate methods for addressing this 
problem in logic-based AI,1 the frame problem can be expanded into 
a broader epistemological problem, as Dennett (1978) and Fodor 
(1983) first noted. Exactly how to characterize this broader problem 
has remained controversial, however.2 The issue is that ‘the’ frame 
problem is rather a cluster of related problems, though their common 
core is that each is concerned with how to determine relevance. 
Wheeler (2008) usefully distinguishes between the intercontext and 
the intracontext frame problem. The intracontext frame problem is 
how to determine, given a context, what information one ought to 
bring to bear on it – what stored knowledge is relevant in determin-
ing what to do? The intracontext frame problem can thus be subdi-
vided into two problems: i) of the many possible actions, which are 
relevant and thus deserving of consideration? ii) of the many possi-
ble consequences of these actions, which are relevant? Computa-
tional intractability threatens, given the sheer number of possible ac-
tions and consequences available for consideration.  
 
Proponents of simple heuristics hold that the intracontext frame 
problem is solved by human agents via simple, formalizable rules of 
thumb that bypass complex search procedures and return an answer 
that is ‘good enough’ in a wide enough range of situations. The price 
they pay is optimality – heuristics don’t turn up the best solution in 
                                                            
1 See Shanahan (1997). Note, however, that these solutions work only in narrowly fixed 
domains, and so fail to contribute towards the development of an artificial agent with hu-
man scale general intelligence. In the terms I set out below, these proposals can be thought 
of as solutions to the intracontext, but not the intercontext frame problem. 
2 For an overview of the controversy see Ford and Pylyshyn (1996). Gabbay and Woods 
(2003, 110-1) identify the frame problem with what AI theorists call the relevance problem.  
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all cases. What they gain is speed and computational tractability, and 
so the intracontext frame problem is disarmed.3  
 
While the exact nature of the solution may be disputed, the general 
form it will take is agreed upon. All that is needed to solve the in-
tracontext frame problem is positing that we humans possess a 
handy bag of tricks or shortcuts for navigating our way through the 
vast stores of information at our disposal. However, even if there is a 
computationally feasible proposal for how we efficiently solve spe-
cific types of problems, a more basic and difficult issue remains – 
how is it that we are able to know which problem we are facing in 
the first place? The issue is somewhat analogous to the difficulties 
facing the student of mathematics who has memorized many formu-
las, but must then recognize not only when a real life situation calls 
for a mathematical solution, but also which of these formulas to ap-
ply.   
 
The intercontext frame problem is precisely that of how to determine 
what context one is in. It is the problem of determining what features 
of the environment one ought to take as relevant, amongst the many 
possible candidates, in specifying the situation. What makes the 
problem so difficult is first that such relevance is largely context-
sensitive, and second that we are confronted with ever-changing 
contexts. For example, whether the fact that there is no milk in the 
fridge is relevant to an agent depends on the context – is she at the 
supermarket; does she have money; is she about to go on vacation? 
Even supposing she is at the supermarket, if an earthquake occurs 
while she’s there, or she realizes that she’s late meeting a friend for 
                                                            
3 In another, perhaps compatible approach (see Carruthers 2007), those who hold that 
the mind has a massively modular architecture may be able to sidestep the intracontext 
frame problem. These modules are characterized by their dedicated functions – they have 
more or less narrow purposes and are informationally encapsulated, in that the amount of 
information the modules are able to draw upon is severely limited. Drastically limiting the 
amount of information available may render the computational process tractable. 
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dinner, then the fact that there’s no milk in the fridge ceases to be 
relevant to the situation. The sheer number of potential contexts 
dashes any hope of specifying a tractable set of rules for determining 
relevance in all but the narrowest of domains. Dreyfus (1992) char-
acterizes the problem in terms a ‘regress of contexts’: the present 
context can only be recognized in terms of features taken to be rele-
vant in a broader context. This broader context can only be recog-
nized in terms of features taken to be relevant in a still broader con-
text, and so on.4  
 
A final point on the scope of the frame problem is that it besieges 
not only practical but also theoretical reason. Not only are we regu-
larly called upon to come up with a swift answer to the question 
‘what should I do?’ but also to that of ‘what should I believe?’5 The 
intercontext frame problem here is: what evidence is relevant in de-
termining what to believe? The intracontext frame problem is: given 
the evidence, what information in one’s stored database should one 
draw upon in order to form one’s beliefs? That the frame problem 
extends to theoretical reason is particularly important when evaluat-
ing the role of the emotions, given that many discussions have been 
confined to the domain of practical reasoning.  
 
                                                            
4 Is the regress infinite? While it may be contexts all the way down, presumably at some 
point one hits rock bottom. However, while it may not be infinite, the regress is neverthe-
less still vicious as long as it renders determining context computationally intractable or 
overly complex and so impractically time-consuming. For example, it would presumably 
take an extraordinarily long time to determine one’s present context if one had to factor in 
all previous contexts. Stipulating that one only draw upon the relevant factors from previ-
ous contexts simply causes the intercontext frame problem to arise anew, as now one must 
explain how such relevance is determined. Thanks to Chris Mole for discussion on this 
point. 
5 It is consideration of the second question that has led some philosophers to draw paral-
lels between the problem of induction and the frame problem, though the reduction of the 
latter to the former is a controversial (and in my view misguided) move. See especially the 
exchange between Fetzer (1991) and Hayes (1991); and Dennett (1978, 1998).  
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2. Emotions and the Frame Problem 
 
Attempts to engineer a generally intelligent artificial agent have yet 
to meet with success, largely due to the (intercontext) frame prob-
lem. Given that humans are able to solve this problem on a daily ba-
sis, one strategy for making progress in AI is to look for disanalogies 
between humans and computers that might account for the differ-
ence. It has become popular to appeal to the emotions as the means 
by which the frame problem is solved in human agents. While Her-
bert Simon (1967) pioneered the integration of affect with human 
cognition, his suggestion that the emotions serve as ‘interrupt sys-
tems’ fell short of addressing the frame problem head on. Ronald de 
Sousa first picks up the thread (1979) and then makes the explicit 
connection (1987), arguing that the “Emotions spare us the paralysis 
potentially introduced by this predicament [of having to first retrieve 
information in order to determine whether it is relevant] by control-
ling the salience of features of perception and reasoning” (172).  
 
In what might be construed as a buildup of momentum, several au-
thors have made claims in recent years that emotions (help) solve the 
frame problem in human, and perhaps artificial, agents. In her land-
mark book Affective Computing (1997), Rosalind Picard argues – 
while discussing the problem of combinatorial explosion – that “AI 
has ignored a crucial component [of human intelligence] that is even 
more basic to human problem solving abilities: the use of feelings 
and intuition to guide reasoning and decision making […] An inte-
gral component of human decision making is emotion, and this 
component could potentially be given to computers” (221-2). Den-
nett (1998) endorses de Sousa’s (1979) proposal as a promising ave-
nue for addressing the frame problem, though he laments the lack of 
a sufficiently concrete scheme for its implementation. Megill & 
Cogburn (2005) are committed to the hypothesis that “the emotions 
play a prominent role in preventing humans from suffering from the 
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frame problem” (311). Ketelaar & Todd (2001) argue that “emotions 
can help the computationally limited human mind to circumvent the 
pitfalls of the frame problem by determining which information to 
attend to in the first place” (204, emphasis original). Evans (2004) 
eschews talk of the frame problem altogether in order to avoid con-
troversy over what the problem really is. However, what he calls the 
‘search problem’ – how to cap the number of consequences of an ac-
tion under consideration – is equivalent to the second part of the in-
tracontext frame problem. Evans takes himself to be elaborating on 
de Sousa’s view, which he characterizes as that the “non-rational 
procedure for delimiting the range of consequences to be considered 
in a rational decision process is governed by the emotions” (181).  
 
Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is often in-
voked as the means by which the emotions solve or help solve the 
frame problem. While Damasio himself does not make explicit ref-
erence to the frame problem, he holds that the emotions, in the form 
of somatic markers, “assist the deliberation by highlighting some op-
tions (either dangerous or favorable) and eliminating them rapidly 
from subsequent consideration” (174).  
 
Just how strong the role proposed for the emotions varies, though 
this is not always made explicit in the literature. This is in part be-
cause it is not always clear what the frame problem is taken to be, 
and thus which problem the emotions are supposed to be solving. 
Leaving aside the specifics of just how the emotions are taken to 
(help) solve the problem in each case, claims can be mapped onto 
the following taxonomy:  
 
H1: the emotions help solve the intracontext frame problem 
H2: the emotions help solve the intercontext frame problem 
H1*: the emotions solve the intracontext frame problem 
H2*: the emotions solve the intercontext frame problem 
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One can also be committed to weaker or stronger versions of H1 or 
H2. Recall that the intracontext frame problem consists of two sub-
divisions: i) of the many possible actions, which are relevant and 
thus deserving of consideration? ii) of the many possible conse-
quences of these actions, which are relevant?  So a weaker version 
of H1 might hold that the emotions help only with (i) but not (ii), a 
stronger version that the emotions help with both (i) and (ii). The 
specific nature and extent of the help the emotions offer will also 
strengthen or weaken H1 and H2.6 A further distinction amongst hy-
potheses that can be made is whether the emotions are taken to 
(help) solve the (intra/inter-context) frame problem in the domain of 
practical reasoning only or also in that of theoretical reason. Even if 
one holds that the emotions alone solve the intracontext frame prob-
lem in the domain of practical reason, if this solution does not ex-
tend to theoretical reason then the strongest claim one is committed 
to is H1. 
 
3. The somatic marker hypothesis 
 
Damasio (1994) first proposed the SMH as a way of accounting for 
the behavioral anomalies of numerous patients with damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). While the means-ends 
reasoning skills of these patients remained unaffected, along with a 
host of other mental capabilities, they exhibited a striking inability to 
                                                            
6 Does the strength of the hypotheses also depend on what one counts as an emotion? 
Perhaps the broader and more inclusive the class or natural kind, the more resources one 
has at one’s disposal for solving the frame problem. On the other hand, increasingly com-
plex and cognitive emotions seem especially subject to the criticisms I make in this paper. 
However, even if only some subset of the emotions are implicated in solving the frame 
problem, one could still adhere to H1* or H2*, if these select emotions solve the frame 
problem on their own. Thanks to Adam Morton for the question, and see Morton (2013) for 
an example of an inclusive view of the emotions. 
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make wise – or sometimes any – practical decisions regarding their 
own lives.  
 
The SMH holds that the emotions are involved in practical reasoning 
– they help us to make decisions concerning what to do.7 Emotional 
feelings serve as somatic markers. They ‘mark’ the content of men-
tal states with either a positive or negative emotional valence.8 Such 
markers may then be reconstituted by the agent during deliberation, 
and thus help guide behavior.  
 
However, as Linquist and Bartol (2012) have pointed out, the SMH 
isn’t just one, but actually a series of separable hypotheses concern-
ing how the emotions are involved in practical reasoning. There are 
at least five conceptually separable stages in the decision making 
process where somatic markers may play a role.9 
 
In the first stage, decision point recognition, a reconstituted somatic 
marker functions to alert the agent that a decision should be made. 
The second stage is that of generating candidate options – somatic 
markers work to heighten, or ‘energize’ working memory and atten-
tion, allowing the options to be generated. In the third stage, deliber-
ation, the agent identifies the implications or additional properties of 
various options. The way somatic markers are implicated in the pro-
                                                            
7 Linquist & Bartol (2013) make a distinction between the Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
and the Somatic Marker Model: “The somatic marker model…describes a putative neuro-
cognitive mechanism for associating autonomic tags with mental representations. Somatic 
marker hypotheses, in contrast, invoke this model to explain some aspect of cognition, such 
as practical decision making” (458). So, strictly speaking, the SMH may hold that somatic 
markers are employed in processes other than practical reasoning, such as theoretical rea-
soning.   
8 Damasio here appears to be using valence to mean what Colombetti (2005) terms ‘af-
fect’ valence: how good or bad an emotion feels. As she points out, however, the term is 
used in multiple and sometimes conflicting ways in the literature on the emotions. 
9 To be clear, these are not necessarily sequential stages – many of these may occur in par-
allel and feed into each other. 
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cess can be sub-divided into two categories. The relevance hypothe-
sis is that somatic markers are involved in helping to identity factors 
relevant to the decision at hand. The search hypothesis is that somat-
ic markers are what put a cap on the time and energy we spend de-
liberating. The fourth stage is that of value assignment and ranking. 
Value assignment occurs when an option is considered. The somatic 
marker triggered by the option serves as a factor that weighs for or 
against it – somatic markers lend valence to the various options. 
Value ranking is then a means of ordering the various options, thus 
allowing the option at the top of the hierarchy to emerge as the cho-
sen plan of action. Somatic markers accomplish this by tabulating 
the valences associated with each option, with the option with the 
highest overall positive valence winning out. In the fifth stage, so-
matic markers serve as the motivators for action – once the agent has 
arrived at a given course of action, somatic markers provide the 
drive to execute. 
 
4. Why somatic markers don’t solve the frame problem 
 
4.1 The SMH and the intercontext frame problem  
 
The intercontext frame problem arises because there are lots of 
things we might potentially pay attention to in order to determine 
context. Decision point recognition thus belongs to the intercontext 
frame problem – recognizing that a decision is called for depends on 
being able to pick out the features relevant to identifying a (change 
of) context. The SMH holds that people solve this problem by pay-
ing attention to the features of the environment that come with a so-
matic marker attached. On the stronger reading of this suggestion, 
corresponding with H2*, people pay attention only to those features 
of the environment that are somatically marked – emotions solve the 
intercontext frame problem. On the weaker reading, H2, people pay 
attention primarily or in part to the valenced features of their sur-
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roundings, but this must be supplemented by other strategies or in-
formation that guide attention.  
 
The problem with the strong version of the claim – that emotions 
solve the intercontext frame problem – is that the valence of objects 
is itself often context dependent. Most objects, people, places, and 
states of affairs possess both positive and negative aspects, which 
are often highly variable depending on context. A knife in one con-
text is a helpful tool for making supper and in another it’s a threat to 
one’s wellbeing. The prospect of taking a test produces a very dif-
ferent feeling depending on whether one has studied or not. Moreo-
ver, there are many concepts which, when combined, elicit an emo-
tional reaction that neither elicits in isolation. As Darwin (1872) 
observed, a man's beard with some soup caught in it is disgusting 
even though one typically considers neither soup nor beards to be 
disgusting. Such contextually elicited emotion is ubiquitous. Which 
of the multiple somatic markers associated with a given object or 
situation should be reconstituted in a given situation? Well, the an-
swer goes, it depends on the context. Recognition of which context 
one is in must therefore come before one can employ the appropriate 
somatic markers, and so they cannot be invoked to solve the inter-
context frame problem. 
 
Might the emotions nevertheless help solve the intercontext frame 
problem? Absent a proposal as to what other elements are involved 
in solving the problem, this claim is difficult to evaluate. However, 
given that somatic markers themselves depend on context for de-
ployment, the extra component needed to supplement the account 
appears to be the kind of thing that would itself determine the con-
text, so this other mechanism would be doing all the work. There-
fore, the emotions do not solve, nor do they help solve, the intercon-
text frame problem. 
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At this point, one might run an objection as follows. Note that H2 it-
self is ambiguous: it could be either that the emotions solve the in-
tercontext frame problem on their own in a narrow range of cases, or 
that they are always mere helpers in a wide range of cases; and the 
first interpretation is not subject to my criticism of H2 here, so it is 
still a live option.10 However, then the challenge is how to make the 
first interpretation tenable – one must explain how it is that the emo-
tions solve the intercontext frame problem on their own in some lim-
ited domain. One might proceed by pointing out that while many ob-
jects and states of affairs are multi-faceted in their valences, some 
may be consistently positively or negatively valenced, independent 
of context. Take the case of fear, for example. When a rabbit spots a 
hawk swooping towards it, it just runs away, no matter what activity 
it was engaged in beforehand. The fear the rabbit feels appears to be 
what initiates the action, with no need to determine context before-
hand. So at least some emotions are capable of guiding action while 
cutting out the middleman of context.  
 
The first thing to notice here is that while hawks are consistently 
negatively valenced for rabbits, there are presumably few objects 
like this for humans. Our world is more nuanced and complex than 
that of a rabbit, and the vast majority of the objects and situations we 
encounter will be multi-faceted in their valences. So even if there are 
a few consistently negatively valenced objects for us, it’s hard to see 
how this will take us any significant distance towards solving the in-
tercontext frame problem. If this is the extent of the help the emo-
tions offer us, then it is exceedingly weak indeed.  
 
Secondly, the action that fear initiates (or perhaps only motivates) in 
the rabbit does not engage practical reason at all; the action is swift 
and reflex-like. It’s hard to see, therefore, how this sort of action 
program could be a solution to the intercontext frame problem at all. 
                                                            
10 Thanks to Dominic McIver Lopes for this point. 
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The frame problem arises on the assumption that we are in fact ca-
pable of acting intelligently, where intelligence is defined along the 
lines of the ability to respond in an adaptive manner to ever-
changing contexts (Wheeler 2008), and this is presumed to take 
place through a rational process of sorts, or at least a flexible cogni-
tive process. While rigid, reflex-like actions may account for our 
ability to leap out of the way of oncoming threats, for example, they 
are ill-suited to capture the sort of intelligence we take human beings 
to possess – the capability of responding to new circumstances with 
the flexibility needed to navigate them in an advantageous manner. 
And to respond in such a way, the identification of contextual fac-
tors is paramount. 
 
4.2 The SMH and the intracontext frame problem  
 
The third and fourth stages of decision-making are where the emo-
tions do the work of addressing the intracontext frame problem. In 
deliberation, somatic markers flag certain options as relevant, and 
determine the time to be spent deliberating. In value assignment and 
ranking, somatic markers serve to further ‘prune down’ the number 
of options.  
 
However, for Damasio’s proposal to be tenable, he must endorse 
something along the lines of Newell & Simon’s (1976) conception 
of problem solving as a search through a state space. On this model, 
rather than generating all the options then pruning them down, indi-
vidual options are generated and tested step by step.11 This is pre-
cisely the tactic Evans (2004) opts for, and so Damasio’s account 
can be supplemented at this point. Evans takes the emotions to solve 
                                                            
11 The reason Damasio must endorse this model is because first generating all possible 
options and then sifting through them simply will not help solve the intracontext frame 
problem – the sheer number of possible options for any given problem will be enormous, 
and in some cases infinite. 
13 
what he calls the search problem, or the problem of when to stop 
listing the possible consequences of actions.12 Invoking Newell and 
Simon’s method, the process of searching for a solution to a given 
problem can be likened to building a search tree. Potential actions 
represent the first level of nodes on the tree. Their potential conse-
quences represent the second level of nodes, the consequences of 
those consequences represent a third level, and so on, with the 
branches becoming ever denser as one expands the tree. While the 
tree one can build up is in principle infinite, in practice a good 
search strategy and test delimit the number of branches to be devel-
oped. A search strategy determines which node of the tree ought to 
be expanded first.13 Whenever a node is expanded a test is then ap-
plied to the result to determine whether it constitutes an acceptable 
solution. On Evans’s view, “emotions prevent us from getting lost in 
endless explorations of potentially infinite search spaces by provid-
ing us both with the right kind of test and the right kind of search 
strategy for each kind of problem we must solve” (185).  
 
Unfortunately Evans provides no account of how the emotions could 
be employed to determine which node of the tree to expand first. 
Perhaps they might work in the form of a rule such as ‘expand the 
most emotionally salient option first.’14 For such a rule to function, 
we would need to be able to emotionally appraise the options with-
out considering their consequences, for if we did so we would there-
by be expanding the nodes on the tree. This rule would be adequate 
for cases where the somatic markers are tied directly to the options 
                                                            
12 The search problem can thus be identified with part (ii) of the intracontext frame 
problem. 
13 One may, for instance, expand all nodes at the first level before moving on to the 
next level, or one may choose to expand one particular first-level node on the tree to a fixed 
depth before moving onto other nodes if the first node provides an unsatisfactory solution. 
14 What if one is indifferent between the options? Then a supplementary rule might 
added – indifference is a signal to expand all of the first level nodes to the next level, thus 
taking their consequences into consideration.   
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themselves – perhaps we have already contemplated or experienced 
their consequences and so have come to mark the option directly.  
 
What test do the emotions provide? It appears that on Evans’s view, 
the emotions function as a test for the viability of a given option by 
providing valence information. Evans defers back to Damasio at this 
point – the somatic markers associated with certain consequences 
count for or against this course of action. If their valence is suffi-
ciently negative, then the option is eliminated. If it’s sufficiently 
positive, then the option is chosen.15  
 
However, while the emotions may help to solve the intracontext 
frame problem, they cannot solve it on their own. The first issue is 
that in many cases the constraints on what options are generated for 
consideration are not wholly determined by the emotions. Recall that 
on Damasio’s proposal, somatic markers serve only to sustain the 
option generation process – they are not implicated at all in the for-
mation of the options themselves. Even supposing they are involved, 
environmental constraints such as the resources one has at one’s dis-
posal, along with background knowledge, habit, and other factors 
will also go into constraining the types of options that are generated 
in the first place. For example, taking a private helicopter to work is 
not an option for most of us – not for lack of enjoyment, but rather 
due to lack of resources. It is for this reason that the strong claim 
doesn’t go through. The emotions cannot solve the intracontext 
frame problem on their own because they cannot be wholly respon-
sible for constraining what sorts of options are generated in the first 
place on their own. So the first component of the intracontext frame 
                                                            
15 What counts as sufficient? While Evans doesn’t provide an account, one may sup-
pose there is some threshold, contextually determined by the importance of the situation. 
Problems deemed extremely important will perhaps require a higher positive score for a 
given option to be chosen, or a lower negative score for an option to be eliminated. The 
emotions may be further implicated here, as the strength of one’s feelings may serve as a 
proxy for the subjective importance of the problem, and so serve to set the threshold itself. 
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problem – how to select only the relevant possible actions for con-
sideration – is not wholly resolved by the emotions.16  
 
The second issue is that not all cases of practical reasoning are likely 
to involve somatic markers in any significant way. While there are 
many emotionally charged decisions we must make in life, so too 
are there many that will leave us cold. These are not cases where we 
are indifferent as to the outcome, but rather cases where there aren’t 
enough somatic markers associated with the consequences in order 
to make this method of option elimination or selection useful. Per-
haps there is as of yet no somatic marker associated with the rele-
vant consequences. Perhaps the decision simply calls upon back-
ground knowledge rather than somatic markers. This is the second 
reason why the strong claim is untenable – the emotions can at most 
help solve the intracontext frame problem because they can’t do all 
the work of eliminating or selecting options in all cases. 
 
Further support for this second point comes from the research of 
Damasio and colleagues on patients with damage to the ventromedi-
al prefrontal cortex. The evidence suggests that the emotions only 
play a role in reasoning in situations that directly involve the agent.17 
In the lab, such patients successfully navigate the many possible op-
tions to generate reasonable solutions to moral, social or instrumen-
tal problems. Given that such patients are hypothesized not to be 
able to reconstitute their somatic markers when reasoning, such 
markers cannot be necessary for successful performance on these 
types of tasks. Therefore, the strongest tenable hypothesis is that 
somatic markers serve to help solve the intracontext frame problem.  
 
                                                            
16 Given that Evans’s search hypothesis addresses only the second component of the in-
tracontext frame problem, it’s unclear that he means to propose a solution to this first issue. 
17 See Damasio (1994), part I.  
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A third issue is that the emotions are unlikely to be of much use in 
solving problems of theoretical reasoning. If one accepts that theo-
retical reasoning also runs up against the intracontext frame prob-
lem, then a proposal about how somatic markers might be of use 
here is in order. It’s hard to see how one might deliver this, though, 
especially given that the VMPFC-damaged patients show no theoret-
ical reasoning deficits.18 
 
A final and more general problem with invoking the emotions is that 
there is not always a straightforward connection between avoidance 
and an object or state of affairs that is marked as negative. We have 
all carried out actions we know we ought to, in spite of not ‘feeling’ 
like it. In addition, we actively seek out some fear-producing items, 
such as horror movies and public speaking. We also seek to avoid 
many items that we consider pleasurable, such as cigarettes and junk 
food. The way we assign value to states of affairs thus appears more 
complicated than mere emotion, suggesting perhaps that value as-
signment and ranking is not accomplished solely by somatic mark-
ers. This in turn speaks to the fact that the emotions can only help 
solve the frame problem.  
 
In its most successful incarnation then, Damasio and Evans’s pro-
posal will be quite weak: it will take emotions to be kinds of heuris-
tics that work along with other heuristics to shrink the space of pos-
sible options. The emotions, on this account, are just one method 
among many to cut down on the number of actions and consequenc-
                                                            
18 There has been recent talk of the epistemic emotions serving as heuristic devices, via 
somatic markers (Hurley et al. 2011). While the workings of the epistemic emotions re-
mains underexplored, I suspect they will be subject to many of the same objections I raise 
here. An important challenge the proposal faces is to explain how VMPFC-damaged pa-
tients manage to perform well on theoretical reasoning tasks. By hypothesis, these patients 
cannot reconstitute their somatic markers, so it appears the emotions are not necessary to 
theoretical reasoning. A possibility (thanks to Samantha Matherne) is that the brain-
damaged patients do in fact exhibit some sort of limited theoretical reasoning deficit, per-
haps in analogical reasoning. 
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es that need to be considered. So while the proposal can be seen as a 
serious contender for helping to solve the intracontext frame prob-
lem, it falls short of solving the problem on its own. However, one 
positive element that emerges from this account is that it suggests 
new directions for empirical research, aimed at exploring the emo-




While the emotions may initially appear to offer a promising solu-
tion to the frame problem, their helpfulness is severely limited. The 
emotions don’t solve or help to solve the intercontext frame problem 
because the valence associated with many objects and states of af-
fairs is itself context dependent. The emotions cannot usefully direct 
us towards relevant features of our environment, because they in 
turn rely on those same relevant features for their deployment.  
 
The emotions don’t solve the intracontext frame problem on their 
own for at least four reasons. First, the emotions are not uniquely re-
sponsible for selecting only the relevant possible actions for consid-
eration. Second, not all cases of practical reasoning are likely to in-
volve somatic markers in any significant way. Third, they are 
unlikely to be of much use in solving problems of theoretical reason-
ing. Fourth, there is not always a straightforward connection be-
tween avoidance and an object or state of affairs that is marked as 
negative. Therefore, the strongest viable claim is the weak hypothe-
sis, H1, that emotions help solve the intracontext frame problem. 
Given the diminished prospects for resolving the frame problem in 
human agents via the emotions, it is unlikely that they will be of 
                                                            
19 While Ketelaar & Todd are advocates of the heuristics research program, their claim 
that the emotions solve the frame problem is too ambitious. The proposal for emotions as 
heuristics here is more modest. 
18  
much use in addressing the problem with respect to generally intelli-




























                                                            
20 For helpful discussion and comments on earlier drafts of this paper thanks to Chris 
Mole, John Woods, the faculty and graduate students of the University of British Columbia, 
and the audience of the 2013 Philosophy and Theory of AI conference at Oxford – especial-
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